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Abstract. In recent years Multi-Agent Systems have proven to be a useful par-
adigm for areas where inconsistency and uncertainty are the norm. Network se-
curity environments suffer from these problems and could benefit from a Multi-
Agent model for dynamic forensic investigations. Building upon previous solu-
tions that lack the necessary levels of scalability and autonomy, we present a 
decentralised model for collecting and analysing network security data to attain 
higher levels of accuracy and efficiency. The main contributions of the paper 
are: (i) a Multi-Agent model for the dynamic organisation of agents participat-
ing in forensic investigations; (ii) an agent architecture endowed with mecha-
nisms for collecting and analysing network data; (iii) a protocol for allowing 
agents to coordinate and make collective decisions on the maliciousness of sus-
picious activity; and (iv) a simulator tool to test the proposed decentralised 
model, agents and communication protocol under a wide range of circumstanc-
es and scenarios. 
 
Keywords: Forensic Investigation, Multi-Agent System, Simulator, Cyber Se-
curity 
1 Introduction 
Providing effective cyber security will require efficient and scalable solutions to 
meet the ever increasing number of needs found within modern expanded networks. 
Typical security solutions utilise a number of specialised systems (e.g., Intrusion De-
tection Systems (IDS) [1], [2], firewalls and forensic tool-kits [3]) often requiring 
high performance hardware to offset the cost of processing large amounts of data. 
These solutions often suffer from two problems that we will address in this paper:  
information overflow, which occurs when systems inefficiently collect all of the 
available information for bulk processing; and the failure to detect advanced stealthy 
attacks, which occurs when systems fail to observe the necessary information required 
for accurate attack analysis. By combining Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) [4] with 
intelligent information gathering techniques, improvements can be made by taking 
advantage of automated forensic investigations to proactively gather the necessary 
data about suspicious activity1.  
A MAS, at its most basic level, can be defined as a collection of intelligent agents. 
Agents are independent pieces of software, often capable of working together to solve 
problems that could not be solved by a single agent. The following properties are 
characteristic of an intelligent agent [4]: (1) Autonomy - The agent's ability to act 
independently without any external human operator interaction. (2) Reactivity - The 
agent's ability to sense environmental changes and react to the situation. (3) Proactivi-
ty - The agent's ability to choose actions to achieve goals. (4) Adaptability - The 
agent's ability to change goals in response to unforeseen circumstances. (5) Commu-
nication & Coordination - The agent's ability to communicate with other agents to 
perform more complex tasks together. 
IDS are deployed in an attempt to solve the problem of detecting malicious actors 
who perform actions without authorisation. Problems such as the costly requirements 
for high performance hardware [5], the inability to monitor all relevant information 
sources [6], the inefficiency of having to process large amounts of information flow-
ing through a network [5], as well as structural vulnerabilities with centralised tech-
nologies make the current era of IDS ineffective.  
In this paper, intrusion detection and forensic data collection techniques are com-
bined with MAS for more effective and efficient detection in response to cyber at-
tacks. This is performed by gathering the relevant evidence. In particular, we present 
a Multi-Agent model for the dynamic organisation of agents participating in forensic 
investigations; an agent architecture endowed with mechanisms for collecting and 
analysing network data; a protocol for allowing agents to coordinate and make collec-
tive decisions on the maliciousness of suspicious activity; and a simulator tool to test 
the proposed decentralised model, agent architecture and protocol under a wide range 
of circumstances and scenarios. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains an over-
view of previous research in the area of Network Security and MAS. Section 3 pro-
vides details of the proposed model including a formal definition of the agent archi-
tecture and the communication protocol. Section 4 describes the simulation tool, the 
parameters for customising the experiments and the simulation results. Finally in 
Section 5 a conclusion, discussion of potential applications of the proposed model and 
future work is given. 
2 Related Research 
Shakarian et al. [7] described a cyber attribution system [8], [9] that takes into con-
sideration different data sources and uses MAS to reason about the origin of an attack 
through the use of agent reasoning. The system uses information gathered about the 
attack as well as information gathered from a wide range of military sources to reason 
in-depth about the attribution of an attack. A highlighted danger of relying on external 
                                                          
1 Suspicious activity is defined as any activity that does not appear to fit the norm of the net-
work. 
sources of information is the trustworthiness of the source, which must be taken into 
consideration. This use of external information provided an effective way to gain 
extra contextual information for detected attacks but was heavily reliant on previously 
collected and catalogued information from military sources.   
Haack et al. [10] developed a hierarchical MAS model for monitoring and report-
ing data within the security environment. The system was composed of a number of 
agent types, each with a specific task to perform, such as event monitor, alert and 
report for system operators. The flow of information consisted of a high level policy 
created by a system operator which would be disseminated to the lower level agents 
responsible for monitoring networked components. Alerts would be generated by the 
monitor agents and aggregated by a higher level agent to make decisions about poten-
tial security events. The structure of this system is inherently centralised as the infor-
mation, which is transferred up and down an agent pipeline, gets processed by one 
dedicated agent rather than having decisions made locally by the individual agents.  
Jahanbin et al. [11] proposed a MAS framework for forensic information gathering 
which uses three types of agents for data collection, data analysis and alert generation. 
The authors note how the MAS paradigm is well suited to the task of forensic data 
collection as agents can be dispatched to areas of the network to perform collection 
and analysis of evidence such as log files. This system is structurally similar to Haack 
et al. [10] with layered agents passing information up the agent pipeline to a central 
agent for decision making. This central agent structure is similar to an IDS as it col-
lects information and then makes a judgement based on that information, however, if 
some information is missing, the system would continue processing new information 
rather than actively searching missing data. 
Baig et al. [12] performed a survey of the current application of MAS in a number 
of critical infrastructure fields including intrusion detection. Emphasis was placed on 
system resilience so that if the system was attacked, resulting in some agents being 
forced off-line, the remaining agents should reorganise themselves to continue opera-
tion. Having agents specifically designed to adapt to network changes (e.g., hosts 
being turned off, firewalls restricting access to a subnet or intentional compromise) 
was shown to be a critical consideration, especially in the security environment.  
Mees [13] designed a MAS to detect Advanced Persistent Threats by using exter-
nal data sources to lookup the origins of suspicious connections. Within the frame-
work three agents were described: a consultation agent to evaluate the location of the 
IP address, an analysis agent to compare the suspect connection with previously seen 
traffic patterns and a third agent to attempt to distinguish between human and robot 
connections by performing task-specific analysis. By using agents in this way to gath-
er external information from data sources located beyond the local network perimeter, 
the agents were able to gather extra information that might not have been available to 
traditional IDSs which, for security, do not usually make external connections. This 
system utilises agents capable of performing multiple tasks which doesn't take ad-
vantage of having a greater number of more specialised agents for improve scalabil-
ity. Our model uses a greater number of specialised agents to encourage competition 
between agents where multiple actions could be taken at any given time. 
3 Dynamic Forensic Investigation Model 
To address the problems of threat detection in networking environments, we pro-
pose a Multi-Agent model that combines the traditional tasks of an IDS using forensic 
collection capabilities to intelligently respond to cyber attacks. By bestowing both 
forensic information gathering and IDS-like information analysis capabilities onto 
agents, the proposed model is capable of automatically following the relevant lines of 
digital investigation after the detection of a suspicious activity.  
The current era of cyber security solutions relies on the bulk collection and pro-
cessing of data to detect instances of malicious behaviour. This centralised approach 
often leads to an overflow of information resulting in performance bottlenecks which 
inhibits the accurate analysis of suspicious activity. This can be improved upon by 
using multiple agents for data collection and analysis, which will be located in multi-
ple physical areas on the network, thereby reducing the amount of information flow-
ing to one single node. The total amount of information that must be processed for a 
particular suspicious activity can be reduced by only actively collecting extra data 
when there is some evidence to suggest that the data is relevant. Instead of collecting 
all possible data at all times, agents should collect the minimal amount to detect spe-
cific attacks and then, if an agent suspects an attack is occurring, start to collect more 
data specific to that activity. This is different to the current era of IDS technologies 
which typically collect all available information at all times regardless of the type of 
suspicious activity. By performing data collection and analysis tasks using a number 
of agents, and only utilising their functionalities when there is cause to do so, the 
resulting system will be both more accurate and efficient since only necessary tasks 
will be performed.  
Rather than having a central repository of all information collected as seen in pre-
vious systems in [10], [11], [14]–[17], in the proposed system, the information is lo-
cally stored within the individual agents. Furthermore, agents are capable of perform-
ing one data collection action using information as input when interacting with a data 
source2 to obtain more information (output) about a suspicious activity. By distrib-
uting data collection tasks among the agents in this way, the processing can be kept 
locally near to the sources of information rather than having a potentially vulnerable 
central system that could be the target of attacks. This organisation in itself provides 
many security and performance benefits over current centralised models, for example, 
agents are replaceable, hence if one agent goes off-line due to an attack or poor net-
work conditions, the remaining agents could reorganise themselves around the infor-
mation gap to continue collecting data. 
3.1 Model Overview 
The model is formally defined as a set of agents (G={g1, ..., gi}), where each agent 
(gi) can perform a data collection action for gathering information about suspicious 
                                                          
2 A data source is defined to be a source of information that exists, this may be an external data 
source such as a DNS server or a local source such as connection logs. 
activities. This information can be formalised by a set of features F representing dif-
ferent attributes or characteristics of a given activity; e.g., the IP address of a given 
connection, VPN usage, etc. Each feature (f ∈ F) has a domain (Df) containing all its 
possible values.  
A data collection action is any forensic collection task that retrieves data from 
some data source; e.g., the collection of Domain Name Service (DNS) logs or a list of 
currently connected IP addresses. Data collection actions are represented using condi-
tions and effects. Conditions must be satisfied to execute the action; i.e., conditions 
represent the information that needs to be known in order to perform a data collection 
action. The effects represent the new information that will be known once the data 
collection action has been executed successfully. 
 
Definition 1. A data collection action is defined as a tuple 〈C, e〉 
• C is the action conditions; i.e., a set of pairs (f, v) where f ∈ F and v ∈ Df; 
• e ∈ F is the action effect; i.e., a feature whose value will be determined by 
the action. 
 
Once an agent executes its data collection action it performs an analysis of the 
available information for suspicious activity; e.g., analysing the geographical origin of 
the collected IP addresses to identify malicious connections. More formally, a data 
analysis action is defined as follows: 
 
Definition 2. Given a set of pairs (f, v) representing the available information 
about a suspicious activity, we define a data analysis action as a function returning a 
value between [0, 1] representing the probability of the suspicious activity being ma-
licious. 
  
Note that the effects of a data collection action are used as conditions for other data 
collection actions, allowing agents to cooperate in extended data collection process. 
In particular, only those agents whose action conditions are satisfied are included in 
the process (i.e., those agents capable of collecting more information by using the 
information already collected as input). Our model includes a protocol to allow agents 
to coordinate when they participate in extended data collection process. The benefit of 
using this model is that a line of investigation only takes place when there is previous 
evidence (i.e., as a satisfied condition) to suggest that more useful data may be found. 
Traditional IDSs do not consider the context of previous information to tailor its fu-
ture actions and target areas that has evidence suggesting more data might be found. 
The proposed model creates a chain of agent knowledge that is built up as each agent 
performs its own data collection which is later used to analyse the attack as a whole. 
Informally, we say that the conditions of a data collection action are satisfied when all 
the pairs feature value in the action condition are also contained by the available in-
formation.  
 
Definition 3. Given a set I formed by pairs (f, v) representing the available infor-
mation about a suspicious activity, and a data collection action 〈C, e〉 we define that 
action conditions are satisfied iff for all (f, v) ∈ C, (f, v) ∈ I; and not satisfied other-
wise. 
 
At the beginning of a security event, only a small amount of information is known 
about the attack so agents will perform actions that will provide context to the situa-
tion. Then, agents with a small number of conditions will first perform their data col-
lection task, simpler data collection actions will have fewer conditions on their execu-
tion. As more knowledge is acquired, more complex agents with multiple conditions 
will be able to perform their data collection tasks while agents that have not had their 
conditions satisfied will not be able to participate. This will improve the efficiency of 
intrusion detection by allowing agents to logically avoid certain collection tasks until 
such a time when there is reasonable evidence to suggest that further useful data will 
be found. For example, assuming that there are 100 available actions, with 50 actions 
that are intended to run on a remote network and 50 that are intended to run on the 
local network. By performing the simple action of determining whether the attacker is 
located either remotely or locally, the agent could reduce the number of possible ac-
tions that would need to be performed. Performing remote analysis when the attacker 
has been identified as being on the local network would be computationally wasteful. 
Using this principle we will achieve greater levels of efficiency by only collecting and 
analysing pieces of information that are relevant to the context of the situation. 
3.2 Agent Architecture 
Agents in the proposed model consist of a set of modules that provide the base 
functionality, each of the following modules: monitoring, intrusion flagging, data 
collection, local analysis, communication and global analysis module, are described in 
detail below. 
Monitoring Module. The monitoring module takes sampling tasks (e.g., monitor-
ing data such as incoming IP address, VPN usage, etc.), distributed across a number 
of agents, to monitor for different network activities. The agents can monitor a host, 
service or network point and the observed data will be stored locally to be used in 
future anomaly analysis. 
Intrusion Flagging Module. The intrusion flagging module is used to analyse the 
monitored data obtained by the previous module against the agent’s local database to 
make a preliminary decision on whether the data is suspicious or not. This is done 
through the use of either signature or anomaly detection. An escalation threshold (π ∈ 
[0, 1]) is used to decide whether the information deviates from the normal patterns of 
the system. This threshold can be set relatively low as the decision on the suspicious-
ness of the event in question is only used to decide whether an extended data collec-
tion process should take place. In comparison to current IDS technologies, in which 
the first layer of anomaly analysis is often the only layer used in the decision making 
process, our model allows different agents to cooperate to further investigate events. 
Data Collection Module. The data collection module is used to interact with the 
data source that allows the agent to obtain more information about a suspicious activi-
ty. As aforementioned, a data collection action requires some known information (i.e., 
conditions) to obtain some new information (i.e., effect). Note that some data collec-
tion actions (e.g., primitive information gathering actions) may not require any condi-
tions to produce an output. 
Local Analysis Module. The output received from the data collection module will 
be analysed by the local analysis module, which uses the agents local database to 
classify the information as either malicious or not. As aforementioned, the local anal-
ysis will calculate the probability of the suspicious activity being malicious. In partic-
ular, the agent builds a local report containing its identity, the output of the data col-
lection module, and its local analysis value. This local report will be used to extend 
the available information about the suspicious activity. 
 
Definition 4. A local report defined as a tuple 〈g, (f, v), p〉 where: 
• g ∈ G is the agent's identity; 
• (f, v) is a pair feature value corresponding to the output of the data col-
lection action performed by agent g; 
• p ∈ [0, 1] is the agent's analysis of the suspicious activity; i.e., the proba-
bility of the suspicious activity being malicious. 
 
During the local analysis, information collected from sources will be analysed us-
ing the agent's local database of results collected from random sampling and anomaly 
analysis. This will produce an analysis of the information, also considering external 
factors such as the validity of the information retrieved, the integrity of the source or 
the integrity of the agent itself. As an example, consider an agent that collects infor-
mation from a mail server. As part of the agent’s tool-kit, it has the ability to check 
third-party bug tracking databases to detect whether there are any known vulnerabili-
ties in the server. Consider the case that the agent finds a critical vulnerability with 
the data source it is assigned to. When the agent comes to take part in an extended 
collection task and finds the event to be innocuous with some degree of certainty, it 
could choose to reduce the degree of certainty to a lower value due to the existence of 
a vulnerability. This is done to adapt to changes in the environment and to take into 
account other factors that existing systems would normally not consider. 
Communications Module. The communications module is used to send and re-
ceive data from other agents to perform extended data collection processes. The 
communications module will send the available information to other agents to be 
added to the existing information by performing their own local data collection task. 
In particular, both the available information and the newly collected information (lo-
cal report) will be combined into a global report.  
 
Definition 5. A global report R is defined as a set of local reports {〈g1, (f1, v1), p1〉, 
..., 〈gn, (fn, vn), pn〉} containing the information collected by different agents participat-
ing in a same extended data collection process.  
 
Extended data collection occurred when each agent performs its local data collec-
tion task, aggregates the newly collected data with the current global report and then 
sends it to the next agent. 
Global Analysis Module. The global analysis module as input a global report and 
makes a decision about the maliciousness of the suspicious activity under investiga-
tion. 
 
Definition 6. Given a global report G representing the local decisions made by the 
agents participating in an extend data collection process, the global decision is a 
function returning a value between [0, 1] representing the collective judgement about 
the maliciousness of the investigated activity. 
 
Various methods could be used to aggregate the results, for example, the average 
or highest number of decisions could be used to arrive at different outcomes. In MAS, 
voting [18] is used to allow agents to make group decisions based on the individual 
experiences of each agent, this is used within the proposed system to aggregate the 
individual local decisions produced by each agent into a global decision about the 
maliciousness of the event. An example voting system might take the highest number 
of votes for either malicious or innocuous and set the global decision to that value. A 
threshold (termination threshold) is used to determine if the global decision has 
reached the required level of certainty to justify the end of the extended data collec-
tion process or if further investigation is needed. 
3.3 Interaction Protocol 
To allow agents participating in an extended data collection to coordinate our mod-
el includes an interaction protocol (depicted in Figure 1) The protocol is formed by 
five main phases: (i) request for participants; (ii) proposals from available partici-
pants; (iii) participant selection; (iv) inform summary; (v) inform result, described as 
follows. 
 
 
Fig. 1. An example information flow between 5 agents. Agent 2 is the current agent. Agent 2 
requests participants to perform extended data collection, Agents 3 and 5 respond while Agent 
4 cannot participate so ignores the request. Agent 2 selects Agent 3 to be the next agent to 
perform its data collection task. After the data collection task, Agent 3 sends back a summary to 
Agent 2, which after making the final decision, sends the result to all previous agents (Agents 1 
and 2) to end the extended data collection process. 
Request for Participants. Once an agent has performed its data collection and 
analysis tasks, the agent must add its local report to the global report and then send it 
onto the next agent for further information collection. The communication module is 
used to facilitate this.  
The first step of the interaction protocol is aimed at requesting help from other 
agents that can participate in the data collection process. In particular, the set of pairs 
feature value are extracted from the global report and then broadcast (by the initiating 
agent) to the other agents. Given a global report 〈g1, (f1, v1), p1〉, ..., 〈gn, (fn, vn), pn〉 a 
request is formalised as a set {(f1, v1), ...,(fn, vn)} containing the available information 
about a suspicious activity. 
Proposals from Participants. Any agents whose data collection action is satisfied 
by the information contained can respond by indicating their availability to participate 
in the extended data collection task. 
Participant Selection. It is possible that several agents respond to the initial re-
quest indicating that they can work with the available data. The initiator must decide 
which agent will be selected to continue with the data collection process. In particular, 
the initiator will send the whole global report to this selected agent.  
Unlike in other MAS solutions, the proposed model does not include a central re-
pository of agents which can be queried to find the most suitable agent for a given 
task. This improves scalability but requires a system to allow agents to find each oth-
er. The agents will maintain a local database of agents that they have previously 
worked with. Deciding which agent should be selected as the preferred agent will 
affect the performance of the system as a whole. If the most optimal agent is selected 
for the task most of the time, the search process will improve as less time is spent 
performing data collection by unreliable agents. There are a number of ways in which 
the preferred agent can be identified based on what is important in a given situation. If 
accuracy is especially important for the current event the agents may select the agent 
that most often votes correctly, this will produce result in a more accurate search but 
could come at the cost of efficiency. If time is an important factor during some event 
the agent may choose the fastest performing agent to collect information quickly, this 
will produce a result faster than the previous but could potentially result in a less cer-
tain decision. While analysis of factors such as these could be done to determine the 
optimal preferred agent selection algorithm, events within the security environment 
can often be unpredictable and allowing the agents to choose the preferred agent at 
run time could produce a more adaptable solution.  
For example, in a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, selecting the pre-
ferred agent based on the speed at which agents are capable of collecting information 
could not result in a timely collection if one part of the network is under attack. How-
ever, selecting agents based on their geographical location (e.g., using the agents that 
are not under attack), would improve the efficiency of the response. 
Inform Summary. To endow agents with information to select the preferred agent 
for a given task the inform summary step sends back its performance summary to the 
agents predecessor. This summary will be logged by the initiator agent for use in the 
preferred agent selection process. The parameters sent in the summary will include 
the agent’s local decision about the maliciousness of the event, as well as, perfor-
mance variables such as the time taken to perform the collection task, the importance 
of the data collected and the computational cost of performing the collection. 
Inform Result. Once a final decision has been reached, the final decision will be 
sent to all of the participating agents, this can then be used by the agents to review its 
method for selecting the preferred agent (e.g., the preference can be increased for 
those agents with local decisions in-line with the final decision). 
4 Simulation Tool 
The proposed model has been implemented as a simulator tool for future testing. 
Agents are initialised with a set of binary features to simulate information about the 
security environment. The agents are displayed graphically as nodes and the path of 
the extended data collection process as it is passed between the agents as edges (see 
Figure 2). 
 
Fig. 2. An example simulation using 15 agents, 5 of which participated in the extended collec-
tion while the rest did not have their conditions satisfied so were unable to run. Nodes represent 
individual agents, blue arrows as well as the number in the square brackets show the order in 
which they ran. 
 
The simulator consists of a number of parameters that can be configured to control 
all aspects of the environment and the agents. Environmental parameters such as 
number of runs and number of iterations control the number of times the simulation 
should be repeated (reinitialising the agent settings each time) and the number of sim-
ulated events, both malicious and innocuous, that will occur per run. Agent variables 
controlling the number of agents, as well as the number of conditions assigned to each 
agent, can be configured to simulate scenarios using a small or large number of agents 
with a variable number of conditions that must first be satisfied before the agent can 
perform its collection action. The analysis variable is used to model the agent's ability 
to correctly detect whether a simulated event was malicious or innocuous. This analy-
sis value is compared to a random assigned real number value between the [0, 1] in-
terval to simulate noise. The higher the analysis value, the more certain an agent will 
be that its decision is correct. In addition, various thresholds such as for deciding 
when an agent should submit its local decision can be configured to set the level of 
certainty the agent must have before voting whether the data is malicious. Controlling 
this variable can be done adaptively and will be the focus of future work. Likewise 
the global decision threshold can be configured to test the effectiveness of different 
voting algorithms when calculating the agent’s final global decision about the event 
as a whole.  
Three types of log files are created during execution of the simulator, the first of 
which is an action level account showing the initial values for each agent as well as 
whether their local decision was correct or not. The second file includes an iteration 
level report which shows the agents involved during each simulated event, whether 
the global decision was correct or not and the statistics to measure the agents perfor-
mance (e.g., true positive rate, false positive rate, sensitivity, specificity, etc.). The 
final log is saved after each run and stores averaged values for the previously men-
tioned agent performance statistics as well as any simulator threshold values.  
5 Discussion 
In this paper we have presented a multi-agent model for forensic investigation with 
potential applications in domains where devices are often distributed across a wide 
area and information is scattered between local and remote networks. Besides that, 
Network Security could benefit from this adaptive model as the environment is un-
predictable and long term goals cannot be planned for. For example, in intrusion de-
tection scenarios the best way to identify an attack or attacker is often heavily de-
pendent on the attacker’s actions and so cannot be defined in advance. Our model 
could also be used over a number of decentralised Internet of Things devices where 
resources are scarce. Agents could be installed onto low-end hardware since each 
agent only has to maintain a local database of logged data specific to their task. Final-
ly, our model could be applied to scenarios that require adaptive information gather-
ing or exploration tasks, as our agents agents are endowed with mechanisms to organ-
ise themselves to perform tasks without top-down or fixed instruction. Our model 
only requires that tasks be broken down into individual actions that can be distributed 
among the agents.  
Future work will be focused on exploring the most optimal configurations under 
different scenarios and accuracy, efficiency and reliability conditions. Another direc-
tion of research involves extending the proposed model with mechanisms to take 
automated action in response to the detected threats. 
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